While exploring adaptation and animation, I will undertake a comparative reading of Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and Disney’s 1951 film adaptation Alice in Wonderland. Paul Wells explores the animated film adaptation in his essay “Thou Art Translated: Analysing Animated Adaptations”. He argues that animation is “a distinctive film-form which offers to the adaptation process a unique vocabulary of expression unavailable to the live-action film-maker” (199); “animation […] provides a vocabulary that enables the most sensitive response to literary texts” (212). Kamilla Elliott delves into the debate surrounding the novel and film as she explores “adaptations and analogies”(211), drawing the distinction between novels that conjure images in the minds of readers, and films that offer words that must compete with the simultaneous images on-screen. She studies the various adaptations of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and contends that the Disney film adaptation is able to illustrate the novel’s verbal imagery successfully with literal pictorial representations of the “hybrid verbal-visual puns” (226-228). My analysis will be primarily confined to Wells’ theorization of the animated adaptation. I will focus my comparison on reading closely the adaptation in terms presented by his model. While drawing from a comparative analysis of Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and Disney’s animated adaptation, I will argue that animation enables the filmmaker to transform the written word to the screen without constraint. This will be made clear while exploring the extensive capacities available to the medium outlined by Paul Wells and Kamilla Elliott, including the “greater continuity between how the text is imagined (the imagist principle) and reformed (the propositional mode)” (Wells 210); the ways in which words evoke images, while images may reciprocally evoke words (Elliott 211); and the seamless transitions from interiority/subjectivity to exteriority/objectivity afforded by this film form (Wells 200).
First I will conduct a close analysis of the novel and film. I will study the key differences, and then examine the transferable elements. As my analysis focuses primarily on the use of animation in the adaptation process, I must study the film’s use of animation, asking questions such as: what narrative elements are transferable that would not have been had animation not been used? What can the filmmakers accomplish using animation? How does the film transfer internal thoughts/consciousness that is present in the novel? How does the film approach metaphorical language that is present in the novel? Which characters and/or events/scenes have been included/excluded during the adaptation process? Many questions must be answered before connecting the textual analysis with the theoretical framework. Once the preliminary comparative analysis is complete, I will embark on my exploration and application of Paul Wells’ theories of animated adaptation. I will look to other academic sources throughout the process so as to compliment my research and my findings accordingly, including the theoretical work of Elliott.
I intend to reach the conclusion that the use of animation allows for greater freedom and flexibility when it comes to adapting a literary text that embodies the “interiority (conscious thought, memory, dream etc.)” and “exteriority (verbal exchange, physical articulation etc.)” (Wells 200). By using Wells’ theoretical model (including the imagist principle, the propositional mode etc.), I will exemplify the ways in which animation enables the adapter to translate the text (as it is imagined) to the screen.
Wells initiates a discussion of the imagist principle and the propositional mode (200) contending that while literature strives to uphold the first movement, in so far as that it utilizes language to offer readers a depiction of the imagined world, he moves forward by suggesting that the propositional model serves as an extension of imagism, allowing readers to conceptualize beyond that which the language provides. By including the propositional mode in his discussion of animated adaptation, Wells accounts for the interpretative conceptions of individual readers. Imagism is therefore a technique by which literature attempts to instill images in the minds of readers through language, while Wells suggests this is merely a starting point for personal conception provided by literature which can then be supplemented with the propositional mode so as to account for alternate visualizations readers may experience. Unlike live-action filmmaking, animation has the flexibility to simultaneously present both the real and the abstract suggested verbally in the text, as well as the conceptual process of the reader.
In order to demonstrate, Wells puts forth the idea of metamorphosis, which refers to the “changes in characters or situations that may be termed ‘magical’ or impossible within the concept of a real world served by physiological, gravitational, or functionalist norms” (201). In Disney’s Alice in Wonderland, many of the inhabitants of Wonderland exemplify the mechanism of metamorphosis. For instance, numerous animals are personified including (but not limited to) the Dormouse, the White Rabbit, the March Hare, Dodo, Bill the Lizard, the Blue Caterpillar, and the Cheshire Cat. In addition to the many human characteristics embodied by some of the creatures, others undergo peculiar “magical’ or impossible” changes, including the Cheshire Cat. In the novel, Alice exclaims, “I wish you wouldn’t keep appearing and vanishing so suddenly: you make one quite giddy.’ ‘All right,’ said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone” (Carroll 79). In the film this fantastical event plays out onscreen, and could not have so seamlessly done so if the film had been a live-action production. It is not only the animals that are anthropomorphized- Alice meets an orchestra of flowers that can dance and sing, a deck of obedient playing cards, and a troublesome doorknob. Also, in this fantastical land, Alice goes through multiple instances of metamorphosis herself as she drastically and rapidly shrinks smaller and grows larger alternately throughout the film. Additionally, the frame narrative by which the film is introduced and concluded, enunciates to the audience that the time spent in Wonderland is all a dream, therefore readily depicting Alice’s psychological state of dream, and ultimately “refuting the anticipatory orthodoxies of time and space (Wells 203).
“Many animators when they are working on an adaptation enjoy moving beyond the limits of language to evoke feelings and establish the meanings they perceive exist within established texts” (Wells 200). In Disney’s adaptation, Alice finds herself lost in a pitch-black forest. This scene has been added to evoke feelings of loneliness, fright, and helplessness perceived within the text.
Roland Barthes, writing in 1977, asks, “What is the signifying structure of illustration?” (Wells 208). He proceeds to consider images that “merely visualize textual description”, images that “add information”, and “when a text is transformed through interpretation” (Wells 208). The overall message/meaning/essence of the literary source text must be evident in the film adaptation. It is this message/meaning/essence that has the power to justify the image. Barthes puts forth a “functional model of anchorage and relay which limits the range of meanings available in the ‘floating chain of signifiers’ in any polysemous image” (Wells 208). He uses the term anchorage to refer to the idea that when text is associated with an image, the language “grounds the image within a limited frame of informational or narrational possibility”; however, it is sometimes the case that a relay text may surpass these limitations, allowing for “alternative meanings or interpretations” (Wells 208). Wells uses Barthes’ concept of anchorage to demonstrate the imagist principle in an animated adaptation, arguing that the notion of anchorage agrees with imagism, while the relay equates to the propositional model (208). In summation, literature attempts to evoke images using language. The literal interpretations are comparable to Barthes’ anchorage. Meanwhile, the abstract in a text may warrant an alternative interpretation, suggested by the propositional mode, which is comparable to Barthes’ relay. To make this clear, consider Disney’s Alice in Wonderland, which of course presents a wide assortment of nonsensical characters and creatures. The arguably realistic portrayal of the young, naïve protagonist Alice is an identifiable starting point in Carroll’s novel, and is easily brought to the screen, physically, emotionally, and psychologically. Alice is an example of Barthes’ anchorage and is also representative of the literal interpretation asserted by imagism. Meanwhile, the fantastical inhabitants of Wonderland are foreign to audiences, as they are to young Alice. Viewers align themselves with the protagonist as she makes her way through this surreal landscape, as things become increasingly curious. The land, the population, and the events that take place come from abstract ideas in the literary source, and there is a greater possibility that different readers will formulate different images in their minds. This is representative of the propositional mode, and also relates to Barthes’ relay. Soon Alice finds that she too undergoes remarkable transformations of that are rather impossible (metamorphosis). Throughout the novel and film, Alice encounters questions pertaining to her identity, what it means to grow up (social norms, rules, etiquette, class, as well as size change and shifting perspective), language, logic, and lessons/morals. Wells reaches the conclusion that, “the act of adaptation in animation, therefore, is not predicated on the determinants of narrative events as described in a literary text but on the stimulants of function and purpose- not the fact that something happens, but the way it happens (210).
Lewis Carroll’s novel is accompanied by illustrations. While taking into consideration the notion of imagism being complemented by the propositional mode, what are we to make of a novel that is paired with illustrations? Do these images impinge on the readers’ processes of imagination and conceptualization? Kamilla Elliott delves deep into a discussion surrounding the relationship between language and image, rethinking the problematic notion that words produce their own images, while illustrations only disrupt the readers’ conceptual process (211). She states, “verbal/visual looking glass analogies are predicated on the reciprocal power of words to evoke mental images and of pictures to evoke verbal figures in cognition” (Elliott 211), while pointing to the scene in Disney’s Alice in Wonderland where Alice meets a garden of speaking flowers (the Live Flowers are borrowed from “Through the Looking Glass”). Alice declares that it is impossible for a flower to have spoken, but she is quickly corrected, “But of course we can talk, my dear”. While the concern regarding adaptation often revolves around the adapter’s inability to create images for a text which readers each have very different conceptualizations of, the converse rebuttal does not surface. Elliott suggests that images have the power to evoke words and meanings, just as a novel has the power to develop images in the reader’s mind. Elliott stresses, “critics have paid far more attention to words that picture than to pictures that ‘talk’” (211). While focusing on language that can create mental images, discussions pertaining to “mental verbalization” (Elliott 211), have been neglected.
Elliott contends that, “through a graded journey from purely verbal through hybrid verbal-visual to purely visual puns, the Disney Alice forges a contiguous bridge for adaptation, both in terms of visual-verbal and form-content dynamics” (226). Lewis Carroll’s written novel provides a wealth of verbal puns. The illustrations were added, offering readers hybrid verbal-visual puns. The Disney film adaptation is a fully animated rendition of the source text and it brings to the screen the enchanting story in purely visual puns. “Hybrid verbal-visual puns in the film are comically nonsensical. The words ‘half a cup of tea’ are pictorially illustrated by a cup of tea sliced in half, rather than the conventional half-full cup” (Elliott 228). In addition to Elliott’s example, the ‘Bread-and-Butterfly’ and the ‘Rocking-Horse-Fly’ both appear in the Disney film (which were actually two of the characters borrowed from “Through the Looking Glass”). The ‘Bread-and-Butterfly’ being a butterfly with wings made of buttered bread, and the ‘Rocking-Horse-Fly’ being a small, flying rocking horse. There are also ‘Dog and Caterpillars’; a Tiger lily with the stripes of a tiger; a Dandelion with the mane of a lion; and Tulips that kiss. Furthermore, when Alice meets the Cheshire Cat for the first time in the film, he (like many other Wonderland inhabitants) finds it amusing to confuse Alice with language overflowing with puns and nonsensical logic. In this scene, he asks if she can stand on her head, and is then shown with his own head detached, as he stands atop, balancing on it as if it were a ball. He proceeds to tell her that most everyone in Wonderland is mad, and says, “you may have noticed that I’m not all there myself”. As he admits this, he is pointing at his body, which begins to disappear. Disney’s animated adaptation successfully illustrates the novel’s verbal imagery by drawing attention to the language once more and literally depicting the hybrid visual-verbal puns pictorially.
Animation also affords filmmakers to make seamless transitions from interiority to exteriority. Novels that offer readers subjective perspectives through the eyes of the protagonist, in addition to objective viewpoints (i.e. omniscient narration), can easily be transferred to the animated screen without disrupting the progression of the narrative. In other words, shifting between subjectivity and objectivity in an animated adaptation unfolds effortlessly and inconspicuously. In Lewis Carroll’s novel, Alice often speaks aloud to herself, revealing thoughts of contemplation and observations. She also thinks to herself throughout the novel while in the presence of others and while she is alone. In addition, an objective perspective is provided throughout the text. An omniscient viewpoint provides explanations, details, and corrections on Alice’s behalf. The Disney adaptation adheres to the novel’s shifting perspective between subjectivity/interiority and objectivity/exteriority. Alice speaks aloud to communicate to audiences her thoughts and opinions when she is by herself, and is frequently mumbling utterances under her breathe in the presence of others. In addition to the varying methods of communicating interiority and exteriority featured in the novel, the Disney adaptation inserts characters at times that are not present in the novel in order to expel necessary details, information, and/or lines of monologue embedded in the novel’s extended periods of contemplation/interiority. For example, in the novel, Alice talks about her cat Dinah to the various characters she meets in Wonderland, while the film version introduces the frame narrative with Alice talking to Dinah during her history lesson in order to divulge necessary information pertaining to Alice’s character including her current disinterest in her studies, her wild imagination, and the fact that she is feeling tired. Similarly, when Alice reaches the tiny door that she is physically unable to pass through, after she has fallen down the rabbit hole, the doorknob comes to life. This character was created for the film and is not present in the novel. The doorknob is added as a buffer to an otherwise long, contemplative scene where Alice must continually converse with herself while she attempts to go through the door. The lines he speaks allow her to respond with her lines from the novel. The doorknob also acts as one of the many mentors Alice comes to meet throughout the Disney film. These characters help with the pacing and progression of the narrative. The conscious choice to add these characters enables filmmakers to offer a more accurate transfer of the memorable language from Carroll’s clever novel, maintaining the embedded feeling, meaning, and tone of the story.
While examining concepts put forth by Paul Wells, Roland Barthes, and Kamilla Elliott in combination with the evidentiary support extracted from Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and the subsequent Disney animated adaptation Alice in Wonderland (1951), I have reached my intended thesis which argues that animation allows a greater flexibility to filmmakers unbeknownst to live-action filmmakers. The images produced by the text, whether concrete or abstract, may be represented pictorially, wedding the seemingly disparate imagism and propositionalism. Animation can also readily succeed in adaptation as it can produce images that evoke language as Disney’s approach to the hybrid verbal-visual puns has proven. Finally, it is now clear that animation exercises its ability to seamlessly travel from interiority/subjectivity to exteriority/objectivity. Where live-action adaptations have failed, the animated adaptation thrives.
Works Cited
Alice in Wonderland. Dir. Clyde Geronimi. Perf. Kathryn Beaumont, Ed Wynn, Sterling Holloway, Verna Felton and Bill Thompson. Disney, 1951. Film.
Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. New York: Knopf Publishing Group, 2006. Print.
Elliott, Kamilla. Rethinking the Novel/Film Debate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.
Wells, Paul. “Thou Art Translated: Analysing Animated Adaptations.” Adaptations: From Text to Screen, Screen to Text. Eds. Devorah Cartmell and Imelda Whelehan. London: Routledge, 1999. 199-213. Print.
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